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The little helpful rhetoric of “Reclaiming public space”
1 One of the most notorious documents of urban policing of the recent past is the “Police
Strategy No 5”,  subtitled:  “Reclaiming the Public  Spaces  of  New York”.  This  paper,
bearing the names of then mayor Rudolph Giuliani and Police Commissioner William
Bratton (Giuliani & Bratton, 1994), enumerates not only the types of behaviour that
have to be fought (the so-called “quality of life-offences”) but in so doing also names
the people that have to be driven out of the “Public Spaces of New York’: panhandlers,
prostitutes,  squeegee  men,  street  artists,  the  mentally  ill  and  the  homeless.  As  a
reaction to such developments, a series of leftist activities since the mid-1990s used the
slogan “Reclaim the Streets!” in a quite contrary sense: here the “reclaiming of public
space” is seen as a way to fight the criminalization and eviction of “undesirables” (cf.
Brünzels, 2001). Apparently both, the supporters as well as the critics of the “social
cleansing” (Smith, 2001) of city spaces, use the concept of “public space” to support
their  claim.  Whereas  the  critics  claim that  everybody  has  a  right  to  enter  “public
spaces”, the supporters state that “to be truly public, a space must be orderly enough to
invite the entry of a large majority of those who come to it” (Ellickson, 1996, p. 1174).
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2 Quite  obviously  here,  “public  space”  becomes a  codeword that  stands  for  opposing
ideas concerning the treatment of a certain part of the population, the undesirables.
The debate about their presence in “public space” is part and parcel of the debates
concerning the management of the social consequences of the recent restructuring of
global  capitalism.  Being  one  of  the  more  visible  effects  of  that  restructuring,  the
growing number of undesirables in the streets and parks of the cities become a social
problem as well as an eyesore. In this context, the “reclaiming of public space” can
either mean “law and order”, holding the poor and the homeless responsible for their
own misery (the notorious “blaming the victim” approach; cf.  Ryan, 1976), accusing
them of “steeling the city” from the “orderly people” (cf. Smith, 1998) and calling on
the repressive state apparatuses to deal with them (for a critical analysis of this “law
and order” rhetoric cf. Beckett, 1997). Or it can mean “social justice”, claiming that the
state bears responsibility for the welfare of all citizens and calling for more money for
education, social welfare and the like (for a critique of this kind of critique cf. Belina,
2002).  In  this  second  version,  “public  space”  can  even  become  “a  code  word  for
socialism”, as Bruce Robbins (1993, p. x) remarks, commenting the usage of the term
“the public” in radical politics.
3 What  is  striking  about  these  two  antagonistic  positions,  though,  are  their
communalities:  Not only do both versions of “public space” use the term as a code
word, an ideological weapon, for something else (something that has little to nothing to
do with “space”, be it “public” or not, but rather with economics and politics). What is
more, both parties direct their claims at the same address: the state. This comes to no
surprise: When the treatment of the excluded – or, as Marx called them in Capital, the
“reserve army” (Marx, 1962, chapter 23) – is at stake in capitalist societies, it is and has
always been the state that has to take care of  them – not for altruistic  reasons, of
course,  but  to  guarantee the existence of  a  functioning and peaceful  working class
(Decker & Hecker, 2002; Piven & Cloward, 1993).
4 In this  article  I  want to  argue that  the concept  of  “public  space” does not  help to
explain the eviction of undesirables from city spaces. In the first part of the article I
want to show that “public space” is a mere normative ideal and nothing that can be
found in “real life”. As such, it can be used to legitimise different and even opposing
interest. I want to further argue that, instead of some abstract nature of “true public
space”,  the  concrete  analysis  of  the  forms  of  and  interest  behind  the  eviction  of
undesirables  from  urban  spaces  should  be  the  object  of  analysis.  This  approach  is
outlined in the rest of the paper: Part two deals with the general nature of accessibility
of urban spaces and new forms of regulating it in the USA and in different Western
European countries. The emergence of the latter is analysed in part three, where the
role of the state, the recent changes in its approach towards managing the “reserve
army” and new ideologies and scales of this approach are discussed.
 
Reclaiming what? The nature of public space
5 To come to  grips  with  the  conceptual  difficulties  concerning the  nature  of  “public
space”, it  makes sense to have a look at its two components,  “public” and “space”,
which  are  both  much  disputed  concepts  themselves.  As  for  the  “space”  in  “public
space”, only one remark is necessary here: The “public space” I am interested in is a
material  space and not  the metaphorical  “public  space” of  debate or  action that  is
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sometimes referred to in the social sciences (cf. Arendt, 1959; Benhabib, 1992). For the
sake of  conceptual clarity,  such metaphorical  “spaces” should be referred to as the
“public sphere”, because, as Neil Smith and Cindy Katz (1992) remind us, the uncritical
usage of spatial metaphors often obscures more than it helps.
6 As Jeff  Weintraub (1992)  shows,  the  term “public”  can take on different  meanings,
depending on the theoretical context in which it appears. Weintraub distinguishes four
main ways in which the concept is used: In the liberal-economist model, the public is
the state as opposed to the market economy, which is the private. In the “republican
virtue” approach the public is the sphere of collective decision making, distinct from
both the state and the market. Third, for theorists such as Richard Sennett (1976) or
Jane Jacobs (1961), the public is primarily about “sociability” and has nothing to do
with either decision making or the state. In many strands of feminist analysis, finally,
the public is defined negatively as everything that is not the family or the household.
The  problem  with  these  different  meanings,  of  course,  is  that  they  are  mutually
excluding: Whereas for liberals the economy is the “private”, for example, feminists
regard it as part of the “public”.
7 When “public space” is invoked in debates about the eviction of undesirables, usually a
concept of the public derived from either the “republican virtue” or the “sociability”
model is drawn upon, implicitly or explicitly. Although the two are analytically distinct,
they also share some common features. Most importantly, in both cases the public is
supposed to be open to everybody. Although this openness is of a more homogenising
kind in the first case whereas it depends on a sort of heterogeneous coexistence in the
second (Weintraub, 1992, p. 303), the exclusion of individuals or groups in these models
contradicts the very idea of “the public”.
8 As Fredric Jameson put it, the topic of the “public sphere” can be said to “‘belong’ to
Jürgen Habermas” (Jameson, 1993, p. 48). As his “republican virtue”-type of analysis of
it is usually regarded as the most influential and theoretically thorough, I will use it as
an example to  show the central  problem with the idea of  open accessibility  of  the
public and its application to “public spaces”.
 
Habermas’s twofold “Öffentlichkeit”
9 Habermas’s object of analysis in his seminal work Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit
(first published in 1962 and translated as The Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere as late as 1989) is the bourgeois public sphere that emerged with the rise of
capitalist social relations, and its subsequent transformation. The heyday of this type of
bourgeois public sphere were the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It consists of
private  individuals  (educated  owners  of  private  property)  who  form  a  “reasoning
public” to debate issues of their common interest in order to promote them against the
state. The self-perception of the bourgeois public includes the “principle of universal
access. A public sphere from which specific groups would be eo ipso excluded [is] less
than merely incomplete; it [is] not a public sphere at all” (Habermas, 1991, p. 85). As
Habermas  notes,  this  accessibility  was  never  actually  realized.  But  as  its  real
participants, the bourgeoisie, acted as if the realization of their (bourgeois) interests
was  the  common  good,  their  “class  interest  was  the  basis  of  public  opinion”
(Habermas, 1991, p. 87). In this respect Habermas shows that the assumption of an all-
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inclusive public sphere is and has always been an ideological tool for the few who are
and were allowed to participate.
10 But  Habermas’s  argumentation  takes  a  turn  that  is  crucial  to  the  meaning  of  his
conception of the public sphere: “On the basis of the continuing domination of one
class over  another,  the  dominant  class  nevertheless  developed political  institutions
which credibly embodied as their objective meaning the idea of their own abolition:
veritas non auctoritas facit legem, the idea of the dissolution of domination into that
easygoing constraint that prevailed on no other ground than the compelling insight of
a public opinion.” (Habermas, 1991, p. 88) This idea of the dialectical Aufhebung of the
ideal of the rule of reason within the public sphere, despite its originally ideological
character, i.e. its potential for the pursuit of the common good of mankind rather that
a particular class interest lies at the origin of the twofold meaning the “public sphere”
takes on in Habermas’s work: it is both, an historical phenomenon and a normative
ideal.  As  Oskar  Negt  and  Alexander  Kluge  criticized  as  early  as  1972,  these  two
meanings are not distinguished clearly enough (cf. Calhoun, 1992; Frazier, 1992; Eley,
1992). Although the double meaning of “public sphere” is not Habermas’s invention –
the German term “Öffentlichkeit” was used in a normative as well as in a descriptive
way since  the  19th century (Hölscher,  1984,  pp.  1138-1139)  –  it  takes  on a  specific
meaning in the context of Habermas’s project of the reconstruction of critical theory.
Here,  the general  idea is  to  measure bourgeois  society  against  its  own legitimizing
ideals as a means of emancipation (cf. McCarthy, 1978, p. 382). But as Habermas cannot
find  any  way  to  ground  his  hopes  for  the  realisation  of  the  ideal  of  the  classical
bourgeois public sphere within the actually existing world around him (cf. Calhoun,
1992, pp. 29-32), he gradually de-emphasises its importance as an historical reality and
turns it into a merely normative concept in his later work (Habermas, 1989, 1992). Here,
the “public sphere” becomes the “fundamental concept of a theory of democracy whose
intent is normative” (Habermas, 1992, p. 446) and for which “complete inclusion of all
parties that might be affected” (Habermas, 1992, p. 449) is constitutive.
11 This move towards an ideal of Öffentlichkeit very much like the one developed by Kant
in  his  famous  “Beantwortung  der  Frage:  Was  ist  Aufklärung?”  (“An Answer  to  the
Question:  ‘What  is  Enlightenment?’” ;  Kant,  1968  [1784]),  that  was  so  thoroughly
criticised by both Hegel in the Philosophy of Right (1986, pp. 389-391) and later Marx as
masking  the  actually  existing  antagonistic  interests  within  bourgeois  society  (cf.
Habermas,  1991,  pp.  102-129),  is  a  move away from an explanation and critique of
capitalist  society and  towards  a  constructive  critique  that  takes  for  granted  its
fundamental relations. In abstracting from the actually existing differences of interest
and  power  to  pursue  these  interests,  this  position  takes  an  affirmative  standpoint
towards the existing power relations. Or, as Robert Holub puts it,  Habermas “places
great [...] faith [...] in bourgeois society” (1991, p. 6). This affirmative position is also the
reason for the somewhat fascinating clinging to the ideal of an all-inclusive “public
sphere” in this “emphatic sense” (as Bernhard Peters (1994) calls it): no matter how
much empirical and theoretical proof for the impossibility of the realisation of such an
ideal  under contemporary social  relations,  it  still  prevails  in scientific  as well  as in
political  discourse  because  of  its  normative  attraction.  It  makes  possible  a  (purely
idealistic) reasoning about the paths towards a better world without having to analyse
the actually existing world.
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12 I have dealt with Habermas at some length because his is the most elaborate conception
of a “public sphere” that saw the light of day as an historical description, turned into a
normative concept and lives a double life ever since. This is important because I want
to  argue  that  any  idea  of  a  “public  space”  as  open to  everybody  makes  the  same,
ultimately affirmative assumption.
 
“Public space” as ideology
13 For many theorists, “public space” is the somewhat spatial, material form of the ideal
of  the  public  sphere  (Goheen,  1998;  cf.  critically  Mitchell,  1995,  pp.  116-117).  For
Marshall Berman, for example, public spaces are (or should be) “environments open to
everybody where, first of all, a society’s inner contradictions could emerge freely and
openly  and,  second,  where  people  could  begin  to  deal  with  these  contradictions”
(Berman,  1986,  p.  477).  For  Sharon  Zukin,  public  space  is  defined  by  “two  basic
principles: public stewardship and open access” (Zukin, 1995, p. 32). This conception
bears at least three similarities with Habermas’s “public sphere”: First, “open access” in
these accounts is a constitutive element of “public space”. Second, this ideal was never
and can never be realised in “real life”: “[T]here are not and never have been truly
open  public  spaces  where  all  may  freely  gather,  free  from  exclusionary  violence”
(Mitchell,1996,  p.  127).  Third,  the  empirical  and  theoretical  impossibility  of  “open
access  for  everybody”  notwithstanding,  this  idealism  remains  a  strong  ideological
feature.  Thus,  the  same  criticism  as  with  Habermas’s  normative  conception  of  the
“public sphere” apply here, too: it is an ultimately affirmative position (Belina, 2001).
Applied to the process of the eviction of undesirables from urban spaces, both opposing
claims from the beginning of the article can be legitimized by referring to the ideal of
“public space”, either claiming access for everybody or the eviction of undesirables in
order to guarantee the access of the “orderly”1.
14 Some theorists, less idealistic, have chosen another path. Instead of searching for “true
public spaces” they point to the intertwining of “the public” and “the private” in urban
spaces  while  emphasizing  the  necessity  to  cling  to  these  concepts  (Kilian,  1998;
Ruddick, 1996).  I  would like to take this point one step further by arguing that the
“public/private”  distinction  does  not  help  at  all  when  the  analysis  of  concrete
processes  like  the  eviction  of  undesirables  from  urban  spaces  is  at  stake.  Quite
contrarily, the measuring of these processes against some ideal of “public space” as
well as their categorization within the framework of “the private” and “the public”, no
matter how intertwined, obscure these processes because of the affirmative character
of  the  terms  “public”  and  “private”.  By  looking  at  the  phenomenon  through  the
spectacles of the “public/private” distinction, all one gets is a normative categorization
of what is taking place: the eviction is either “good” or “bad”, either “justified” or not.
What one does not get is an explanation why it takes place. Instead of choosing this
necessarily normative approach, I want to argue that the analysis should concentrate
on the concrete interests that are involved, the way that these interests are pursued
and the ideologies  that  are  used to  legitimize this  pursuit.  Before turning to  these
questions, I want to focus on the more general one: How is accessibility to urban spaces
regulated and by whom?
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Regulating the accessibility of urban space
15 Rules  and  regulations  concerning  the  accessibility  of  city  spaces  exist  for  every
conceivable  space.  These  rules  are  imposed  by  and  reflect  the  interests  of  their
respective  owners,  be  it  a  private  body  or  the  state.  They  are  not  negotiated  in  a
rational  discourse  between  equals  (as  Habermas  wishes)  but  fought  for  within  the
existing  power  relations,  with  ownership  being  a  central  element  of  these  power
relations. But ownership does not allow for arbitrary rules: Private owners cannot in-
and exclude people according to their private interest only but have to obey the rules
of the state, the law. Questions of in- as well as of exclusion are thus ultimately dealt
with by the state, no matter who the owner of the respective space. The institution
responsible  for  the enforcement of  the state’s  interests  is its  executive branch,  the
police.
16 This relatively clear competence seems to be blurred by the (re-)emergence of private
polices. In privately owned spaces, the owner can, in addition to the police, rely on
private police forces. Recent years have witnessed the rise of such private polices in
“public spaces”, too, such as streets, plazas, parks or subways (Bayley & Shearing; 1996;
Jones & Newburn, 2002; Nogala, 1995; Eick, 1998). Some commentators interpret this
development as the end of the state’s monopoly of policing (Bayley & Shearing, 1996) or
as a threat to the state’s monopoly of legitimate power and a further sign of the “end of
public space” (Beste, 1996). These authors point to the major difference between the
public police and private polices: The private police execute private interests only (as
opposed to the police’s commitment to the common good) and act as if they had the
same authority as the police (Beste, 1996, pp. 322-323). But as the deployment of private
polices has to be permitted by the state, and as it is, unlawful excesses notwithstanding,
confined to the state’s laws, the private police can neither use means nor pursue ends
that are not compatible with the framework provided by the state. As Trevor Jones and
Tim Newburn (2002) emphasize, the term “monopoly of policing” is used in different
ways within these debates. They continue: “If all that is meant by ‘monopoly’ is that the
public police were the sole repositories of state-backed coercive power, then the public
police monopoly continues today” (Jones & Newburn, 2002, p. 133). The co-operation
between the two is a type of Public Private Partnership (Eick, 1998, p. 113), but one in
which the “public” side, the legislature, makes the rules of the game. The legal debates
in  Germany,  for  example,  therefore  focus  on  the  question  of  how  much  authority
private polices can be granted without substantially weakening the state’s monopoly of
power  (Krölls, 1997;  Kirsch,  2002).  The  private  police  is  not  outside  of  the  state’s
monopoly of power but a cheap expansion of it.  The reason for the state to permit
private police forces are primarily financial (Krölls, 1997, p. 445). That is why Nogala
(1995) prefers to call the process the commodification and commercialization rather
than privatization of security.
17 Emphasizing that the means and ends of policing are ultimately decided upon by the
state and that the police (including the private police) are tied to the law does not mean
that policing is equal in all locales and free from the influence of discourses other than
the law. As police research has shown, the work of the police “on the street level” can
take on different forms in different locales because of different “cultures of policing”
(Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993, p. 90). Apart from different strategies of policing in different
cities,  local  public  debates  concerning  questions  of  policing  or  different  local
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interpretations of  national  debates  can affect  the way laws are  interpreted.  This  is
especially true for all the forms of “proactive policing”, that are so popular today, i.e.
police activities that take place before any crime has happened. Here, the officer on the
beat constantly makes “‘low visibility decisions’ that have great effects on the lives and
liberties of individual members of the public” (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993, p. 119). It is up to
the discretion of the individual police officer whether or not to interfere in certain
situations.  It  is  a  question  of  interpretation  if,  for  example,  a  homeless  person  is
begging “aggressively” (criminalized in many cities)  or  not,  or  if  a  group of  young
people are “loitering with the intent of selling drugs” (illegal in many U.S. cities) or if
they  are  just  standing  around,  chatting  (Livingston,  1997).  Taken  together,  local
cultures of policing and the high level of police discretion in proactive forms of policing
highlight  the  importance  of  the  predominant  debates,  both  local  and  national,
concerning  the  means  and  ends  of  policing  as  they  influence  the  way  the  law  is
interpreted  and  enforced.  The  case  in  point  is  the  probably  most  important
catchphrase concerning policing in recent years, the rhetoric of “zero tolerance”.
 
The CatchPhrase “zero tolerance”
18 As  may  be  well  known,  the  term  “zero  tolerance”  is  usually  connected  to  the
plummeting crime rates in New York in the 1990s. The new strategy of the NYPD is
credited with this success by many commentators and, of course, by the protagonists of
that strategy (Bratton, 1998; Kelling, 2000). In the following years, the concept of “zero
tolerance” as the solution to the “urban crime problem” spread throughout the world,
relying on the “New York success story” as empirical prove (Wacquant, 1999; Smith,
2001; see below). This is somewhat strange for several reasons. First, critics point to
similar  trends  in  crime  rates  in  cities  with  different  policing  strategies  and  offer
alternative explanations of the crime drop, such as demographics or the end of the
crack epidemic (Greene, 1999; Innes, 1999, pp. 403-408). Second, the “fathers” of the
new strategy, Police Commissioner William Bratton and his Deputy Commissioner for
crime  control  strategies,  Jack  Maple,  respectively  emphasise,  that  their  approach
should not be characterized as “zero tolerance” (“zero tolerance is neither a phrase
that I use nor one that captures the meaning of what happened in New York City”;
Bratton, 1998, p. 43; “‘zero tolerance’ is bad policing and a bad strategy”; Maple, 1999,
p.  213).  Third,  there  is  no  coherent  concept  of  “zero  tolerance policing”.  The only
relatively clear idea behind it is the “cracking down” on all sorts of minor offences
(“quality of life offences”) such as drinking, sleeping or urinating in public, begging,
vandalism, graffiti, littering, fare evading and so on. The theoretical assumption behind
this approach is the “broken windows theory” (Wilson & Kelling, 1982), according to
which physical  decay and “incivilities” are signs of  deteriorating social  control  and
therefore invitations for criminal acts. In practice, all sorts of strategies and measures
can  be  and  have  been  called  “zero  tolerance”  and  linked  to  “broken  windows”.
According  to  Martin  Innes,  “it  is  precisely  this  ‘flexible’  quality  which has  made a
partial  contribution  to  the  popularity  of  the  Zero  Tolerance  Policing  perspective”
(1999,  p.  397).  By  calling  them  “Zero  Tolerance”,  many  different  initiatives  are
discursively  linked  to  the  “New  York  success  story”,  making  the  term  a  strong
ideological tool. As legal scholar Michael Walter summarizes for the German discourse:
“‘New York’ and ‘broken windows’ have become symbols in the field of the politics of
crime which, beyond their actual origin, stand for a tougher way of coping with petty
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criminals and against rehabilitation as a leitmotiv” (Walter, 1998, p. 359). The terms
“zero tolerance” and “broken windows” have thus become ideological  catchphrases
that stand, as Christian Parenti calls it, for “the science of kicking ass” (Parenti, 1999, p.
69). One of the effects of the usage of these catchphrases by local or national elites may
be the perception by the police that a “tough” interpretation of the existing laws is on
the agenda.
19 Thus, on the “street level”, the law and its interpretation both frame how urban spaces
are policed and thus who is allowed to enter them. But the law remains the main set of
rules as differing interpretations of it must remain within its confines.
 
Concrete measures
20 To become a powerful ideological catchphrase, “zero tolerance” has to be more than a
mere  idea,  of  course,  and  refer  to  something  concrete.  “On  the  street  level”,  this
“something” are  various  measures  of  surveillance  and law enforcement,  sometimes
introduced under the name “zero tolerance”, sometimes not, that are relatively new in
the US and Western Europe. Three types are especially clearly aimed at the eviction of
undesirables.
21 One is the practice of the police to stop and control people that have not done anything
wrong and are controlled without proper probable cause. In the USA, such stops are
theoretically forbidden by the 4th Amendment and several Supreme Court decisions in
the 1960s guaranteed the right not to be stopped without probable cause. Since the
1990s the police has therefore begun to systematically use “pretext stops”, where a
minor (and sometimes made up) offence is used as a pretext to stop a person. According
to Jack Maple, his “tactic one” for the NYPD was the “assertive enforcement of quality-
of-life laws, like those against public urinating, public drinking, loud radios, turnstile
jumping, and truancy” (Maple, 1999, p.151). According to Maple, this is different from
“zero  tolerance”  as  the  NYPD  was  “selective  about  who  [they]  were  arresting  on
quality-of-life infractions” (Maple, 1999, p. 155). What this means is demonstrated in an
analysis  of  police  stops  during William Bratton’s  tenure as  Police  Commissioner  by
Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies (2000). They show that the new strategy resulted in “a
vast  increase in misdemeanor arrests,  but  also a sharp decline in their  quality and
sustainability  in court” (Fagan & Davies,  2000,  p.  476).  But  not  only did apparently
arbitrary stops increase. They were also “primarily tied to race as well as places that
are defined by race” (Fagan & Davies,  2000,  p.  496).  The authors conclude that  the
strategy  was  “not  about  disorderly  places,  nor  about  the  quality  of  life,  but  about
policing poor people in poor places” (Fagan & Davies, 2000, p. 457). In Germany, to give
another example, stopping people without any probable cause, making even a pretext
unnecessary, was first legalized in Bavaria in 1994 with the legislature of other Länder
and the Federal Border Police, that polices airports and railway stations, following the
example. Here, too, minorities and the poor are most affected (Herrnkind, 2000).
22 Second,  the  video  surveillance  of  urban  spaces  is  a  “selective  gaze“  (Williams  &
Johnstone, 2000) that is used “to ensure that an area looks correct, and should be rid of
anybody who is judged out of place” (Williams & Johnstone, 2000, p. 194). Again, it is
clear who is “out of place”. As Clive Norris and Gary Armstrong have shown, analysing
600 hours of video surveillance in three British cities, mainly the young and minorities
were surveyed (1999, pp. 108-116).
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23 Third, measures exist that make the mere being in certain spaces a crime for certain
people. In all German cities, for example, alleged drug users are banned from certain
city center spaces. These people are issued with a map showing the area that they are
not allowed to enter anymore. These so called “Betretungs-verbote” (“entering bans”)
are applied to “break up open air drug scenes” in German cities since the early 1990s. In
many cases, the measure is applied against people who are only suspected to belong to
the open air drug scene; a suspicion that can only be based on the appearance of that
person,  making  people  of  color  the  primary  victim  of  these  bans  (Belina,  2000;
Krasmann  &  de  Marinis,  1997).  A  similar,  spatial  approach  are  the  “anti  loitering
statutes” used in the US. As statutes directed merely at loitering as such were declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the 1960s and 70s (Simon, 1992, pp. 641-645),
cities  are  now passing more specific  ones  aiming at  “those who are loitering for  a
particular purpose, with a certain intent, or in a certain place” (Wozniak, 1999, p. 23).
Here is one example of how these statutes work: In “drug free zones” in Baltimore,
Maryland, it is illegal “to loiter or remain in any public way, public place or place open
or  legally  accessible  to  the  public  […]  for  the  purpose  of  engaging  in  drug related
activity” (Baltimore City Code, Art. 19, § 58C). Although the Maryland Court of Appeals
stated that “an arresting officer must find probable cause that a person is loitering
‘with the intent of engaging in drug-related activity’“  (Monahan, 1994, p. 779), reality
seems to be different. As the authors of the much acclaimed book The Corner, a half
journalistic half ethnographic description of a drug corner in West Baltimore, David
Simon and former police officer Edward Burns summarize their experience: “There is
nothing  for  a  patrolman or  plainclothesman  that  is  as  easy,  as  guaranteed  and  as
profitable as a street-level drug arrest. (...) In Baltimore, a cop doesn’t even need to
come up with a vial. He can simply charge a suspect with loitering in a drug free zone, a
city statute of improbable constitutionality that has exempted a good third of the inner
city from the usual constraints of probable cause” (Simon & Burns, 1998, p. 167). Again,
the measure is applied against people that are not wanted in a certain space.
24 Usually  a  mix  of  measures  and  strategies  is  applied  to  evict  the  undesirables.  The
treatment of the homeless in the USA is a case in point. As the National Law Center on
Homelessness  &  Poverty  summarizes  in  a  1999  report,  local  anti-homeless  actions
“typically include the enactment and/or enforcement of city ordinances that restrict
homeless  people’s  use  of  public  spaces  for  necessary  activities  such  as  sleeping  or
sitting, the enactment and/or enforcement of restrictions on begging, police ‘sweeps’
to remove homeless people from specific parts of town, or selective enforcement of
generally applicable laws such as prohibitions on loitering, obstruction of sidewalks, or
public intoxication” (NLCHP, 1999, p. 1; cf. Mitchell, 1997).
 
Social welfare and politics of crime: bringing the
bourgeois State back in
25 All of these measures are made and enforced by the state, be it on the local or on the
national scale. They are fixed in laws and ordinances and enforced by the police. The
question then is why the state takes care of the undesirables by evicting them from
urban spaces, in other words: why he makes it his interest to deal with them in this
manner. As this is not the place to engage in state theory, only some central arguments
of Marxist debates about the state, especially the state derivation debate of the 1970s,
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shall be summarized here (Flatow & Huisken, 1973; Holloway & Picciotto, 1978; Decker
& Hecker 2002).
 
The state, capital and the reserve army 
26 The interests of the bourgeois state are not identical with the interests of capital; in
some cases they are derived from them, in others the state pursues interests of his own.
The state, depending on a successful national economy, shares the interests of “his”
national capital  as a whole in economic success.  As single capitalists do not pursue
these interests of their class in general because of the competition among them, the
state takes care of these interests. The case in point here is the constant reproduction
of  a  functioning working class  according to the needs of  capital  (Decker & Hecker,
2002).  This  interest  coincides  with  the  genuine  interest  of  the  state  in  a  pacified
population that does not rebel but sees the state as its means to a better life. To achieve
this aim of a socially peaceful and functioning working class, politics of social welfare
and politics of crime are pursued simultaneously.  The criminologists Helga Cremer-
Schäfer and Heinz Steinert call the complementary relationship between the two the
“alliance  of  ‘crime  &  punishment’  and  ‘weakness  &  welfare’“  (Cremer-Schäfer  &
Steinert, 1997, p. 252). As for the politics of welfare, it is important not to assume that
they are morally driven and exist to help people in need as an aim in itself. As Frances
Fox Piven and Richard Cloward showed, focussing on the example of the USA: “Relief
arrangements  are  ancillary  to  economic  arrangements.  Their  chief  function  is  to
regulate labor” (Piven & Cloward, 1993, p. 3). Besides taking care of these interests of
the capitalist class as a whole, the state may in certain cases share the interests of
specific capitals, for example when agriculture or steel production are subsidized or
when wars are waged to help the national oil industry. But this is not to be mixed up
with  reducing  the  state  to  an  accomplice  of  single  capitals.  This  last  point  is  of
importance when it comes to the interplay of scales in the policing of city spaces. On
the local scale, the success of shopping and retail capitals and the tourism industry in
city centres is the main aim of much of the new initiatives (Mitchell,  1997; Parenti,
1999, pp. 90-110; Ronneberger et al.,  1999). But politics on the local scale cannot be
pursued against the general direction into which the nation state’s treatment of the
working class is heading. The example of the treatment of vagrants in Germany may
serve  as  an  illustration:  The  Deutsche  Städtetag,  the  lobby organisation of  German
cities, started an initiative to re-criminalize vagrancy (and thus homelessness) in 1977,
three  years  after  it  had  been  de-criminalized.  This  initiative  clearly  aimed  at  the
eviction of the homeless as a means to promote city centre shopping (Klee, 1979, pp.
68ff.). But at the time, such an initiative was not compatible with the more inclusive
general trend in national politics of welfare and crime.
From inclusion to managing the excluded
27 So what  is  the  reason for  the  change  in  national  politics?  The criminologist  David
Garland, writing about the USA and the UK, has termed the general approach of the
1970s  “penal-welfarism”  (Garland,  2001,  pp.  27-51),  a  combination  of  “the  liberal
legalism  of  due  process  and  proportionate  punishment  with  a  correctionalist
commitment to rehabilitation, welfare and criminological expertise” (Garland, 2001, p.
27). Focusing on the German case, the sociologist Joachim Hirsch uses the term “Fordist
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security state” (Hirsch, 1980, 1998) to describe the strategy of mass integration based
on  the  simultaneous  increases  in  both  social  welfare  and  surveillance  pursued
throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Both Garland and Hirsch agree that the focus of the
state’s politics of that period was the inclusion of the individual. The material reason
for this approach were the low unemployment figures of the period that gave rise to
the fear of a scarcity of workers and an increasing cost of labor (Cremer-Schäfer &
Steinert,  1997).  As this  situation has changed completely,  so has the importance of
inclusionary  politics  of  social  welfare  and  rehabilitation  compared  to  exclusionary
politics of  crime and punishment.  As large parts of  the working class have become
unnecessary and joined the “reserve army”, they are dealt with in a merely repressive
manner. Today, the aim of social control is not the inclusion of the individual, but the
management of certain groups: “The task is managerial, not transformative” (Feeley &
Simon,  1992,  p.  452).  This  managerial  type  of  control  is  also  the  reason  for  the
popularity of spatial measures of policing (see above) as it abstracts from the individual
and focuses on groups (“dangerous classes”) and spaces (Belina, 2000, pp. 105-109).
28 The managerial approach is especially visible in the USA, where the Fordist welfare
state  has  never  been as  established as  in  most  Western European countries.  In  his
account  of  the  development  of  the  us-American  criminal  justice  system,  Christian
Parenti gives a detailed account of the new law-and-order approach and is also able to
show how this approach is linked to the development of US capitalism. According to
Parenti, beginning in the early 1980s, “law and order” in the USA “is fundamentally
about  controlling  the  ‘deregulated’  populations  created by  economic  restructuring”
(Parenti, 1999, p. 43). But similar trends can be observed in different Western European
countries as well. Hebberecht and Duprez (2001) sum up the development in Western
Europe of the past two decades as a general move away from a policy directed at social
prevention and towards a more situational prevention that focuses on technical means,
especially in “public and semi-public spaces” (Hebberecht & Duprez, 2001, p. 374). Quite
in  contrast  to  the  neoliberal  ideology  of  “less  state”,  the  state  is  very  active  and
interventionist  in  this  respect  (Hebberecht  &  Duprez,  2001,  p.  375).  In  France,  for
example, a law-and-order approach began to replace the French model of prevention
that was based on social prevention from the early 1990s onwards (Body-Gendrot &
Duprez,  2001).  In  this  context,  the  term “tolérance  zéro”,  introduced  into  political
discourse by the extreme right (FN) in the early 1990s, spread and was used extensively
by the (victorious) right during the presidential campaign 2001 (Elie, 2001). In Ireland,
“zero tolerance” was the key to the victory of Fianna Fail in the 1997 elections which
was dominated by the topic of “crime”. In the two years after, “the criminal justice
system  has  undergone  the  most  fundamental  changes  in  the  history  of  the  state”
(Cleary, 1998)2. Finally, in the UK, too, “politicians across the spectrum have hailed zero
tolerance as the most promising remedy for Britain’s crime problems” (Dejevsky, 2002)
with Tony Blair being a long time and outspoken supporter of the concept (Macaskill,
1997; Webster 1998).
 
New ideologies and new scales
29 Part and parcel of the practice of the new politics of crime is an ideological shift. As
Garland notes for the years following the early 1980s: “Crime – together with associated
‘underclass’ behaviours such as drug abuse, teenage pregnancy, single parenthood, and
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welfare  dependency  –  came  to  function  as  a  rhetorical  legitimation  for  social  and
economic  policies  that  effectively  punished  the  poor  and  as  a  justification  for  the
development  of  a  strong  disciplinary  state”  (Garland,  2001,  pp.  101-102).  In  this
national context, local initiatives to re-criminalize homelessness and other underclass
behaviours in city spaces, much like the unsuccessful one by the Deutscher Städtetag
mentioned above, are more successful today then they were back in 1977. Thus, when it
comes to policing the undesirables,  it  is  still  the nation state that is  in charge and
redirects  politics  and ideologies  according to  the perceived needs of  “his”  national
capital. Although the new measures of policing the poor are enacted by the authorities
on the local scale, they are framed by the state on the national scale. What is more,
many of the new measures that aim at the eviction of undesirables on the local scale
have  been  initiated  by  the  national  scale.  Two  trends  from  the  UK  may  serve  as
illustration: The fact that British citizens today are “the most surveilled population in
the world” (Norris & Armstrong, 1999, p. 39) can largely be explained by the extensive
funding of local CCTV systems by the Home Office that began in the 1980s and exploded
after 1994 (Williams & Johnstone, 2000, p. 188) – so much so that for example in the
Welsh town of Cardigan, with a population of fewer than 4,500, the available funding
seems to have been the only reason for the implementation of a CCTV system (Williams
& Johnstone, 2000, pp. 199-200). Second, since the passing of the “Crime and Disorder
Act”  in  1998,  cities  and  towns  in  the  UK  are  obliged  to  form  “Community  Safety
Partnerships”, where problems of disorder are to be addressed, in order to get funding
for  crime  policy  initiatives.  A  similar approach  was  taken  in  Belgium,  where
community policing (“police de proximité”) was introduced in the early 1990s when the
central state decided to emphasize the role of the local police and obliged communes to
form “Conseils  consultatif  communal  de  prévention”  if  they  wanted to  profit  from
financial  aid  (Cartuyvels  & Hebberecht,  2001,  pp.  406-411).  This  decentralization  in
effect made proactive policing and, in some cities, elements of zero tolerance “the main
lines along which an approach of an enhanced spatial and temporal proximity of police
intervention is based” (Cartuyvels & Mary, 2002, p. 47).
 
Conclusion
30 In the context of a general shift  from a more inclusionary politics of welfare to an
exclusionary  politics  of  “law  and  order”  as  a  means  of  social  control  and  the
reproduction of a functioning working class, the debates and struggles concerning the
“reclaiming of public space” are just one moment of much larger social processes that
are at their core driven by the development of the capitalist economy and regulated
and managed by the state. In this light, then, the opposing claims over the “reclaiming
of public space” are basically two different ideologies of “public space” (Mitchell, 1995)
that are used to legitimize different interests and hope to affect the law making as well
as the law enforcement process on the local scale (Belina, 2001). Thus, the “nature of
public  space”  and  the  distinction  between  “private”  and  “public  spaces”  are  not
substantially important here, but used ideologically. As such they do not contribute to
an explanation of the eviction process but in calling on the state rather obscure its
reasons. Although the high visibility of the presence of undesirables in the cities gives
this struggle a symbolic importance, and although it may have positive effects for their
everyday  life,  it is  nevertheless  one  derived  from  much  broader  developments.
Substantially,  the  struggle  is  not  about  access  to  public  spaces  but  about  wealth.
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Concerning  the  geography  of  the  struggle,  it  is  finally  important  to  note  that  the
developments  that  explain  the  recent  emphasis  that  is  put  on  the  eviction  of
undesirables from urban spaces are not fought out on the local scale but concern global
capitalism and its regulation by the nation state.
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NOTES
1. Thus the claim quoted already earlier on: “to be truly public, a space must be orderly enough
to invite the entry of a large majority of those who come to it” (Ellickson, 1996, p. 1174). In a
thorough analysis of Ellickson’s influential Law Review article “Controlling Chronic Misconduct
in City Spaces” (Ellickson, 1996), Don Mitchell shows that, with the exception of “orderly” people
and the police, “Ellickson’s community is thus apparently the community of property” (Mitchell,
2001, p. 79) – an unintended reference to the bourgeois public sphere, where, as we have seen,
private ownership of property was the central precondition for accessibility.
2. There is a nice story concerning the “traveling concept” of “zero tolerance” to be told here: In
1997, the Dublin-born then NYPD Deputy Commissioner John Timoney, who was invited to take
part  in  a  committee  on  the  politics  of  crime  in  Ireland,  rallied  for  “his”  “zero  tolerance”
approach. Only Fianna Fail’s shadow minister for Justice, John O’Donoghue, endorsed the concept
while  the  rest  of  the  political  elite  and  the  Irish  police  were  not  too  impressed.  Although
O’Donoghue’s  initiatives  after  the  victorious  elections  were  “no  more  than  a  token  gesture
towards  the  full-blown  notion  of  zero  tolerance”  (O’Mahony,  1997),  his  name  came  to  be
identified with “zero tolerance” so much that, when in 1999 an Irish-American became mayor of
Baltimore  (USA)  on  a  “zero  tolerance”  platform,  the  Sunday  Times  commented:  “Even  his
political  platform  has  Irish  resonances:  one  of  O’Malley’s  promises  is  to  introduce  John
O’Donoghue-style zero-tolerance policing to Baltimore” (Burns, 1999).
ABSTRACTS
In political  as  well  as in scientific  debates,  the concept of  “public space” is  invoked by both
supporters and critics of the eviction of undesirables (beggars, drug addicts, prostitutes) from
urban spaces. Both sides use the concept as a codeword standing for opposing interests, both
directed at the state. Drawing on Habermas’s conception of the “public sphere”, the paper argues
that any such notion of “public space” is necessarily normative and does not help to explain the
eviction of undesirables. Instead of this idealism, an analysis of the concrete processes and the
interests that drive them is sought. This is done by examining the nature of regulating the access
to urban spaces, the rhetoric of “zero tolerance” and the concrete measures of law enforcement
applied in various cities in the US and Western Europe. These are shown to be means of the state
to control the “reserve army” and thus part and parcel of global social processes.
Dans les débats politiques et scientifiques, le concept d’“espace public” est cité par les défenseurs
comme par les adversaires de l’éviction des indésirables (mendiants, toxicomanes, prostituées)
des espaces urbains. Les uns et les autres utilisent ce concept comme un slogan représentatif
d’intérêts antagonistes mais pareillement opposés à l’État. A partir de la conception de la “sphère
publique”  de  Habermas,  l’article  défend  l’idée  que  toute  notion  d’“espace  public”  est
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nécessairement normative et n’aide pas à expliquer l’éviction des indésirables. Au lieu d’un tel
idéalisme, une analyse des processus concrets et des intérêts qui les sous-tendent est proposée.
La nature de la régulation de l’accès aux espaces urbains, la rhétorique de la “tolérance zéro” et
des mesures concrètes appliquées dans des villes américaines et européennes sont examinées.
Ces processus sont des moyens de l’Etat pour contrôler “l’armée de réserve”. Ils font à ce titre
partie des processus sociaux globaux.
INDEX
Mots-clés: espace public, tolérance zéro, armée de réserve, géographie politique
Keywords: public space, zero tolerance, reserve army, political geography
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